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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of R&D cooperation, exploring the rela-
tionship between cooperation, knowledge generation and economic results. Specifically, we 
focus on research joint ventures (RJV) supported by the R&D Framework Programme (FP) of 
the European Union and study the impact of this type of technological agreement on the la-
bour productivity of private participants.   
RJV have been defined in the literature as formal arrangements to cover non-equity agree-
ments and organized so that partners (public or private organizations) can pool resources in 
order to undertake joint R&D activities (Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000). Consortia 
shaped under the FP have been considered to be a clear example of international RJV, since 
they involve partners from different nationalities which invest their own resources in R&D 
activities in order to obtain appropriable results (Caloghirou and Vonortas, 2004).  
Literature concerning RJV performance remarks the complexity of this analysis, due to the 
multidimensional character of technological cooperation and, thus, the absence of broad ac-
cepted indicators. The choice between objective performance measures, such as profitability 
or growth rates, and subjective data collected form surveys, will be strongly determined by 
the target of the study (Veugelers, 1998; Martin, 2003). Likewise, the unit of analysis (indi-
vidual partners or collective performance) will be selected according to the scope of the eval-
uation (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002).  
The interest in knowing the economic effects of RJV is even more justified when cooperation 
is supported by public funds (Combs and Link, 2003). As for RJV supported by the FP, the 
great part of the research has considered individual participants as unit of analysis, although 
there are remarkable attempts aiming to explain how the FP contributes to build and consoli-
date R&D networks within the European area (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006; Breschi 
and Cusmano, 2006). Prior studies have followed different and complementary methodolo-
gies, pointing out the positive effect of this type of cooperative agreements on firms’ techno-
logical capabilities (Tsakanikas and Caloghirou, 2004; Dekker and Kleinknecht, 2008; Polt, 
Vonortas and Fisher, 2008). Nevertheless, empirical evidence about the effect of the FP on 
firms’ economic performance is scarce (Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco, 2010).  
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With the aim to enlarge this evidence, our approach elaborates on economic performance of 
RJV supported by the EU FP. Given the technological character of these consortia, we think 
that productivity can be an outstanding measure of economic results. Recent literature recog-
nises new knowledge as an essential source of firms’ productivity growth, pointing out that 
this growth is more related to the results of technological activities than to the inputs used in 
them. Specifically, Crepón, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) developed a multi-equational model 
(hereafter the CDM model) that explains productivity growth by technological outputs and the 
outputs by technological effort. Based on this research, we estimate a recursive empirical 
model to capture the relationships between R&D cooperation, knowledge generation and la-
bour productivity. Under this model, we are assuming that participation in the FP would help 
firms to improve their technological profiles, and these new capabilities could lead to ulterior 
productivity increases. Thus, participation in the FP could have an indirect effect on this per-
formance measure.  
In addition, we take into account that the participation in RJV supported by the EU FP implies 
a process selection that includes both the self-selection by participants to join the R&D con-
sortia and elaborate a proposal, and the selection of projects by the European Commission to 
award the public aid. In fact, the main obstacles that authors must face when trying to meas-
ure the economic impact of participation in the FP are two: 1) how to avoid the self-selection 
effect and 2) how to join data on participation and on economic performance for a period long 
enough to capture the long-term effect of the FP R&D projects. 
Following Barajas and Huergo (2010), our empirical approach takes into account that cooper-
ation in this program is the result of two decisions. First, firms have to decide whether or not 
they engage in the consortia. Second, the agency decides to approve or to reject the project 
after the evaluation. In this second stage, we are considering a selection equation in order to 
avoid the self-selection effect that can produce bias when the information considered refers 
only to firms with accepted projects. Afterwards, we analyse the effect of participating in the 
FP on technological and economic results.  
The second obstacle has been solved by joining two complementary databases. The first one, 
provided by the CDTI (the public organism in charge of monitoring the participation of Span-
ish firms within the FP), contains much relevant information about the FP projects and the 
participants and allows us to discriminate between the decision to apply and the agency selec-
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tion. Additionally, we use data provided by the SABI database that consists of company ac-
counts for over 1,000,000 Spanish firms. This allows us to build a control sample with infor-
mation on economic variables. Thus, we compile homogeneous samples containing infor-
mation about more than 50,000 firms and for a long-term period.  
In contrast to other impact studies of the FP, the features of our database allow us to carry out 
the empirical analysis from a more in-depth and precise approach. Moreover, our database 
contains information for a period long enough to capture the long-term impact of participation 
in FP consortia. Thus, we consider a time lag of five years from the application year of each 
project. Other works are not able to establish the same time lag for all the projects or consider 
a short-term horizon1. Finally, previous literature does not take into account the existing dif-
ferences among FP instruments. In order to guarantee the homogeneity of the sample, only 
Specific Targeted Research Projects (STREPs) and Integrated Projects are considered in the 
present paper since these participation modalities fit the RJV definition. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 summarises prior literature focused on R&D coopera-
tion impact and, more specifically, on the FP.  In Section 3, we present the database and the 
model used to carry out the empirical analysis contained in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, 
we draw some conclusions from the results, also pointing out key policy implications.  
 
2. Previous empirical evidence on the impact of R&D cooperation  
Literature analysing the impact of R&D cooperation points out the obstacles to find appropri-
ate indicators, due to the multidimensional nature of this topic and the difficulties of data col-
lection (Veugelers, 1998). Several approaches co-exist, regarding the unit of analysis (indi-
vidual participants or collective performance) and the type of measures (objective or subjec-
tive indicators) (Caloghirou, Ioannides and Vonortas, 2003). Since RJV have multiple targets, 
the assessment of results will be determined by the fulfilment level of partners’ objectives. 
Empirical studies have focused, mainly, on individual participants, stressing the relevance of 
harmonizing methodology background with evaluation targets. Econometric analysis of R&D 
                                                 
1 Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) consider a sample of firms participating during the period 1992-1994, indis-
tinctly, and analyse their economic results for the period 1995-1996. Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) use infor-
mation for firms supported in FP4 and FP5, but they have no information about the concrete year of participa-
tion. Impact is measured considering sales of new products introduced in the market during the period 2002-
2004 for the whole sample.  
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outputs is recognized as one of the most appropriate method to evaluate the effectiveness of 
private outputs (Martin, 2003). 
Theoretical foundation of impact analysis faces also the heterogeneity of models. R&D coop-
eration has been explained from several conceptual perspectives. Thus, the effect of coopera-
tion on firms’ performance could be interpreted according to different theoretical assumptions 
(Caloghirou, Ioannides and Vonortas, 2003). Whereas industrial organisation and transaction 
costs theories have explained RJV from a cost-profit neoclassical model, other approaches 
related to strategic management stress the strategic relevance of cooperation and focus on 
aspects inside the firm, such as access to external knowledge, learning processes or internal 
absorptive capacity. From the resource-base perspective, R&D partnerships and in-house 
R&D are considered complementary strategies aiming to increase technological capacities of 
firms. Following this conceptual framework, many authors have built objective performance 
indicators related to technological capabilities (mainly from patents databases) and have con-
cluded that R&D partnerships have the predicted positive effect on internal capacity 
(Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1998; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002; Scott, 2003).  
With the improvement and international harmonisation of innovation statistics in the Europe-
an Union (mainly throughout the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in the 1990s), re-
searchers were able to measure the impact of R&D cooperation on new output indicators 
closer to the firms’ innovative activity. This source of information also allows for distinguish-
ing different kinds of cooperation according to the type of organisation selected by the com-
pany to carry out joint R&D projects. Researchers introduce explanatory variables capturing 
the type of cooperation (related to the type of partner) in empirical models, and measure their 
impact on some indicators of innovation output. Most of the papers find a positive relation-
ship between cooperation with universities/research centers and innovation output measured 
by the volume of sales due to new products (Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Faems, Van Looy and 
Debackere, 2005; Lööf and Broströn, 2008). These results corroborate the relevance of Intel-
lectual Property Protection as explanatory variable of cooperation impact, especially when 
partners are universities or public institutions (Hall, Link and Scott, 2001).  
Empirical research focused on economic impact of RJV has been carried out more frequently 
in the framework of policy assessment. The increasing amount of public funds devoted to 
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R&D consortia in the European Union and the changes in antitrust rules allowing joint ven-
tures in US are two clear examples of this trend. 
At this respect, Combs and Link (2003) analyze the economic foundation of research partner-
ship, aiming to justify public intervention. From an exhaustive review of previous theoretical 
studies, they conclude that research partnerships are a socially beneficial organizational form, 
but they stress also that more empirical research focused on economic efficiency is needed.  
One of the first studies analysing the effect of cooperation on economic results was carried 
out by Siebert (1996). This author uses a sample of 314 US joint research ventures registered 
from 1985 to 1992 in the NCRA-JRV databases (National Cooperative Research Act) and 
confirms that the effect of R&D intensity on profit margin is higher for cooperating firms than 
for non-cooperating firms. Nevertheless, cooperation does not affect profit margin.    
Using data from CIS and other objective information sources, Belderbos et al. (2004) measure 
the effect of different types of cooperation on Dutch firms’ performance, captured by two 
indicators: the growth of added value per employee (as an indicator of labour productivity) 
and the growth of sales per employee from new-to-the-market products (as an indicator of 
“innovative sales productivity”). Available data for the period 1996-1998 allow them to 
match information on innovative activity and financial indicators for more than 2,000 enter-
prises. They cannot confirm that cooperation with universities has an effect on labour produc-
tivity, but instead find a significant impact on innovative sales growth. Aschhoff and Schmidt 
(2008) reinforce the positive relationship between cooperation with universities and the new-
to-the-market product innovation. In the same study, these authors also confirm the effect of 
cooperation in process innovation, capturing throughout this indicator the cost-reduction fac-
tor associated with collaborative R&D.   
Another remarkable attempt to demonstrate the economic effects of R&D cooperation is the 
paper by Cincera et al. (2003). These authors analyse the effect of international R&D cooper-
ation by including not only R&D expenditure, but also R&D cooperation in a classical pro-
ductive growth function. This latter indicator is a proxy of available external know-how 
(knowledge spillovers) and complements the internal innovation effort. Empirical results con-
firm the positive impact of R&D intensity on sales growth. However, only cooperation with 
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more applied objectives (with customers, suppliers or other companies) has a positive impact 
on sales growth. 
In general, the literature confirms the existence of a positive relationship between R&D coop-
eration and innovative results, but the effect on economic performance is not so evident. Tak-
ing into account different types of cooperation processes, empirical evidence seems to cor-
roborate that the more market-oriented the cooperation is, the higher the probability of finding 
positive economic effects (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Cincera et al., 2003; Belderbos 
et al., 2004; Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco, 2010).  
2.1 The impact of cooperation taking place within the FP 
The Framework Programme (FP) is the main political instrument supporting cooperative 
R&D within the European Union. It was born in 1984 with the aim of coordinating dispersed 
R&D activities funded by the European Commission. Since then, seven editions of the FP 
have been launched, evolving towards increasing budgets, new participation models and wid-
er research priorities. 
Throughout the seven editions, the operative scheme of the FP has been characterised by sev-
eral key aspects. Roediger-Schula and Barber (2006) remark that all projects are promoted by 
self-organised consortia, shaped by different kinds of partners and located in different nations 
(usually, consortia are integrated by firms, public research centres, universities and users). 
Moreover, supported projects have a limited duration and their R&D activity is co-financed 
by grants coming from the European Commission and private funds coming from consortia 
partners. Evaluation and selection processes have been traditionally based on scientific excel-
lence and relevant socio-economic aspects and carried out by independent experts in each 
technological area. 
R&D cooperation within the FP is characterised by some specific features, such as the partic-
ipation of universities and research institutes in consortia and the relevance of pre-competitive 
research. Thus, we can assume that FP projects are close to the public-private or institutional 
cooperation model. In fact, as we will show below, literature on FP impact remarks that the 
main contribution of this programme is the improvement of innovation capabilities and most 
of the empirical studies do not find a direct effect on economic results. 
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Impact studies carried out in several European countries (the UK, Austria, Finland, Germany, 
and Ireland) have reported the same general conclusions regarding firms’ performance: low 
levels of commercialisation, significant generation of new scientific knowledge, significant 
acquisition of technical knowledge and capabilities; improved access to technical networks 
(DTI-Office of Science and Technology, 2004). In the same line, Georghiou et al. (1992) find 
that the main benefit for industry is the improvement of skills. Also Luukkonen (1998) ob-
serves that the promotion of ‘infrastructural’ matters (such as skills and training of personnel) 
can be considered the primary impact of EU research programmes.  
The specifics of the FP regarding economic impact are reinforced by Benfratello and Sem-
benelli (2002). Matching data on 411 participants in Eureka and in the FP and balance sheet 
information from the AMADEUS database, these authors compare the effect of cooperation 
taking place in the two different programmes. They corroborate the positive influence of Eu-
reka cooperation on some economic variables (labour productivity and price cost margins), 
but they cannot find any effect for the case of FP participants. Authors explain these results 
by the differences between the two programmes: Eureka is more market-oriented and the FP 
is more focused on pre-competitive projects.   
Some studies have found different effects regarding firms’ characteristics. Thus,  Luukkonen 
(2000) suggests that commercial and short-term objectives are much more relevant for small 
firms, since these companies are not able to maintain a large project portfolio and their inno-
vation activity is based on short return periods, allowing them to finance consecutive R&D 
projects (European Commission, 2009). For the case of the Swedish industry, Arnold et al. 
(2008) report that the FP impact largely depends on the activity branch. They analyse four 
industries and confirm that, when the objectives of the FP consortia are closer to the market 
and the participation of big companies is more important, like in ICT or vehicles, the econom-
ic impact is higher. On the contrary, in live sciences or energy, the most relevant impact of the 
FP is related to the increasing technological capabilities of small and medium-sized firms 
(SME).    
Similar results were obtained by Polt, Vonortas and Fisher (2008). They analyse the relation-
ship between the participation in the FP and the innovative activity of enterprises using data 
from the Community Innovation Survey and a wide database on participation in FP5 and FP6. 
They remark that industrial participants are characterised by higher R&D intensity and better 
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network advantages. They are more oriented to international markets and have a greater pro-
pensity to patent.  Compared with projects financed by other sources, FP projects are less 
market-oriented, have longer development periods, are focused on non-core technologies of 
participants and are related to basic research activities. From the organisation perspective, 
these authors find that FP projects must face a lower degree of flexibility and higher adminis-
trative burdens. According to this empirical evidence, the authors conclude that the participa-
tion of non-entrepreneurial organisations is increasing and, consequently, the proportion of 
results that could lead directly to industrial innovation has declined.  
Introducing a new perspective, Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) take into account the self-
selection of applicants and analyse whether the FP participants from the Netherlands, Germa-
ny and France have better performance indicators because they participate or because they are 
more innovative. They confirm the existence of the self-selection bias associated with partici-
pation in the FP and estimate the impact equation correcting this aspect. Concerning the FP 
impact, they consider firms participating indistinctly in FP4 and FP5 and analyse the effect on 
innovative output, measured as logs of sales of innovative products per employee. These au-
thors cannot corroborate a positive effect on innovative results, but they find a positive influ-
ence on R&D intensity for companies with fewer than 100 employees.  
To summarise, empirical evidence on the impact of the FP seems to indicate that the main 
contribution of this programme to the industry participants is related to the improvement of 
scientific and technological capabilities and not directly to the firms’ economic performance.  
 
3. Empirical model and data  
 
With the objective of enlarging the scarce empirical evidence about the effects of R&D coop-
eration on economic performance, our model turns to the literature on R&D impact to find a 
suitable framework where technological output and economic efficiency interact. Following 
the seminal works by Solow (1957) and other authors which incorporated R&D as an endoge-
nous factor in the production function (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), many 
studies have tried to quantify the contribution of technology to the economic growth of a 
country, industry branch or enterprise, concluding that the private return of R&D investments 
is lower than the social one. Griliches (1992), Mohnen (1996) and Nadiri (1993) confirmed 
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that, on average, the social rate of return is 50% to 100% higher than the private one. Grilich-
es and Mairesse (1984), Jaffe (1986) and Verspragen (1995) demonstrated that those spillover 
effects associated with R&D activities are responsible for the increasing rate of returns when 
knowledge flows from one firm or institution to others. 
In the 1990s, available data on firms’ innovative activities open new research paths and new 
approaches are proposed. One of the most relevant works is the paper by Crepón, Duguet and 
Mairesse (1998). Using data from the French Innovation Survey, these authors build a model 
(CDM model) which considers that the effect of R&D on firms’ productivity is the result of 
the innovation outputs and not directly of the R&D activity. Their empirical analysis con-
cludes that technological results are favoured by the R&D intensity and the innovative dy-
namic of the activity branch. Moreover, productivity is positively influenced by the introduc-
tion of innovations in the market when controlling by human resources’ qualification and 
physical capital.  
The basic CDM model includes variables measuring the internal effort in R&D, but does not 
take into account the effect of external spillovers. In this respect, cooperation has been con-
sidered by some authors a valid proxy for explaining knowledge generation associated with 
those knowledge spillovers. Cincera et al. (2003) argue that cooperation is an alternative for 
measuring voluntary access to external knowledge and also for controlling the involuntary 
outgoing spillovers. In fact, a considerable amount of empirical research corroborates the rela-
tionship between the propensity to cooperate and the relevance of spillovers for the innova-
tion process (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; López, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009).  
Our empirical approach, based on the CDM model, also establishes a recursive model struc-
ture to capture the relationship between R&D cooperation, knowledge generation and eco-
nomic results. However, at the same time, we take into account that the participation in RJV 
supported by the EU FP implies a process selection that includes both the self-selection by 
participants to join the R&D consortia and the selection of projects by the European Commis-
sion to award the public aid. 
In this sense, when analysing the impact of any public aid, the implicit question to answer is 
what the behaviour of a supported firm would have been if it had not received this public aid. 
The problem is that each firm can only be observed either in the status of receiving the public 
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support or not; that is, we cannot directly observe the additional effect. As is well known, if 
aid was granted randomly to firms (or consortia), we could estimate the effect of public aid on 
(for instance) performance as the difference between the average one in supported and non-
supported firms. However, the evidence shows that aid is not granted randomly. Therefore, to 
measure the effect of public aid, we need to estimate or approximate the counterfactual. That 
is, we have to take into account that the awarding decision by the public agency probably de-
pends on the same firm (or consortia) characteristics that determine performance. The econo-
metric literature has developed several methods in order to solve these difficulties2. One of 
the most used alternatives, and the one that will be followed here, is the Heckman selection 
model, which involves estimating what determines the receipt of the aid (the “selection equa-
tion”).  
Nevertheless, the application of this method is not free of difficulties. Most of the empirical 
studies that try to explain the impact of national or international aid programmes have infor-
mation only about financed projects, and therefore are not able to distinguish between the 
firm’s decision to apply for the aid and the agency selection among the proposals (see, for 
example, Blanes and Busom (2004), who refer to participation in R&D subsidy programmes). 
The main disadvantage of this lack of information is that the selectivity problem is not fully 
considered. However, in our database, we also have data about rejected applications, so we 
can estimate separately the determinants of both decisions.  
Therefore, our empirical model consists of four equations that reflect the following recursive 
stages: first, the firm’s decision to apply for the aid; second, the agency selection among the 
proposals; third, the generation of knowledge from the innovation activities involved in the 
cooperative R&D project; and, finally, the addition of this new knowledge to the production 
process.  
Formally, the equation which describes the decision to apply for an FP cooperation project 
takes the form:  

  otherwise0
0if1 111*1
1
iii
i
uxy
y
     (1) 
                                                 
2 See a detailed discussion of the different methods in the survey by Aerts, Czarnitzki and Fier (2007). 
 12
where *1iy  is a latent dependent variable, x1i is the set of explanatory variables, 1 is the vector 
of coefficients and u1i is the error term. The firm i applies within the FP if *1iy  is positive.  
Conditional on firm i applying, the agency can award or reject the proposal. Again, the proba-
bility of being awarded is formalised in terms of a binary model: 

  otherwise0
0if1 222*2
2
iii
i
uxy
y
     (2) 
where *2iy  is the latent dependent variable, 2  is the vector of coefficients, u2i is the error 
term, and x2i is the set of explanatory variables which are assumed to be strictly exogenous or 
predetermined longer in advance. The proposal in which firm i participates is approved if *2iy  
is positive.3  
The error terms in equations (1) and (2) might contain some common omitted variables, and 
therefore the correlation term ρ between u1 and u2 might be unequal to zero. In that case, there 
may be a sample selection bias, and the estimation of coefficients β2 only for proposals yields 
inconsistent estimates. To face this problem, following Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), we 
estimate both equations as a Probit model with sample selection by maximum likelihood, ap-
plying, in a Probit analysis, the same device that Heckman (1979) introduced for an analogous 
problem when explaining a non-dichotomous variable.  
After the joint estimation of both equations, we proceed to estimate the impact of the support-
ed cooperative project in terms of output. Given that the R&D projects supported through the 
FP are generally long-term projects (the average duration of a project is around 24 months 
and before starting the project, the negotiation phase with the European Commission could 
also take several months), it seems reasonable to analyse its impact once the project has for-
mally finished. This is even more justified in the case of consortia supported by the Frame-
work Programme, as it is more focused on pre-competitive projects than other programmes 
supporting JVs, which are more market-oriented. To capture the expected long-term effects, 
the measures of output that we include in our analysis refer to the period t+5 relative to the 
awarding year. 
                                                 
3 Notice that more than one firm can participate in the same proposal, and the same firm can participate in more 
than one proposal every year. To establish a clear correspondence between firms and projects, in our sample we 
have only included one project per firm and year.  
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Specifically, in the second step, we analyse how participation of the firm in an FP project af-
fects the generation of new knowledge. This is approached by the proportion of intangible 
fixed assets over employment, which constitutes an indirect measure of innovation output, 
given that the knowledge generated in the R&D project will usually be reflected by the vol-
ume of intangibles inside the firm (especially in the case of patents and R&D investments). 
Therefore, the next equation in our model is:  
*
3 3 3i i i ik p x u         (3) 
, where ik  stands for a firm’s intangible fixed assets, and *ip  denotes the predicted value for 
the probability of participating within the FP. We include the prediction instead of the dummy 
for observed participation to take care of the selectivity problem. 3ix  is a vector of other con-
trol variables in equation (3).  
In the last step of the model, we estimated the impact of the intangible assets, as an indicator 
of knowledge capital, on a firm’s labour productivity, as an indicator of economic success. 
Therefore, if we find that intangibles are affected by participation within the FP, and that 
these intangibles increase productivity, the economic impact of the cooperative project will 
also be supported by the evidence. As a consequence, the last equation in our model takes the 
form 
4 4 4i i i ig k x u         (4) 
, where ig  is labour productivity, ik  is knowledge capital (represented by intangible assets) 
and 4ix  stands for other additional controls in equation (4). We take care of the endogeneity 
of ik  in this equation by using the predicted values from equation (3) in the estimation. 
In equations (3) and (4), dependent variables refer to period t+5 relative to the awarding year. 
As we have explained previously, the R&D projects supported by the FP are generally long-
term, and it seems reasonable to analyse its impact once they have formally finished and firms 
have obtained economic returns.4  
To summarise, in this paper we apply a structural model which has the following basic struc-
ture: (i) firms decide whether or not to apply for a FP cooperation project; (ii) the proposal is 
                                                 
4 In fact, in their analysis of the effectiveness of the Eureka Program, Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco (2010) 
find that the completion of a Eureka project has a positive impact over firms performance measured as return 
over assets, although the effect does not manifest itself until a year after project completion. 
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awarded or rejected by the European Commission; (iii) the innovation activities involved in 
the cooperative R&D project succeed through the generation of new knowledge (represented 
by intangibles); (iv) the addition of this new knowledge to the production process results in 
productivity growth. Since we assume a recursive model structure and do not allow for feed-
back effects, we follow a three-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we estimate a max-
imum likelihood probit model with sample selection (equations (1) and (2)). In the second 
step, we estimate the knowledge production function (equation (3)) (proxied by the stock of 
intangible fixed assets), using the predicted value of the probability of participating within the 
FP to take care of the selectivity problem. In the last step, we estimate the productivity equa-
tion, using the proportion of intangible fixed assets as an indicator of knowledge generation. 
We choose this structural model because it captures the main features of the phenomenon we 
want to analyse, but is parsimonious and empirically tractable with the data we have availa-
ble.  
 
3.1 Database  
Empirical analysis is focused on consortia supported by EU FP and, more specifically, our 
sample refers to Spanish participants during the period 1995-2005. The database used here is 
provided by the Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI), which is the 
public organisation in charge of monitoring the participation of Spanish firms within the FP. 
Since FP6 went into effect, the CDTI has been the organisation in charge of the maintenance 
and management of the information related to Spanish participation in the FP. As a conse-
quence, the CDTI-PM database includes information about all the proposals,5 eventually grant-
ed or not, in which at least one Spanish firm participated between 1995 and 2005. This period 
covers part of FP4 (1994-1998), all of FP5 (1999-2002) and part of FP6 (2003-2006). 
This information from the CDTI-PM database has been complemented with the SABI database 
that contains the company accounts of more than 1,000,000 Spanish firms between 1995 and 
2007. The merger of the CDTI-PM and SABI databases has been possible because Spanish 
firms are identified both in the CDTI-PM and the SABI databases through their company tax 
codes. 
                                                 
5 To guarantee the homogeneity of the sample, only Specific Targeted Research Projects (STREPs) and Integrat-
ed Projects are considered.  
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From the SABI database, we have selected a control sample that takes into account the availa-
bility of data about the relevant variables for each firm. Given that Spanish firm size is smaller 
than the European average (European Commission, 2003), we have designed the sample selec-
tion considering a firm to be large when its number of workers exceeds 200, although the 
threshold in international statistics is usually set at 250. We have chosen all companies employ-
ing more than 200 employees. Firms employing between 10 and 200 employees are selected by 
a random sampling scheme for each NACE class (two-digit) level, and represent around 4% of 
the Spanish Central Companies Directory (CCD), which comprises all Spanish companies and 
their local units. This makes our control sample representative of the Spanish economy.6 Alt-
hough we have information since 1995, the sample used in the empirical analysis of participa-
tion refers only to the period 1999 to 2005, given that FP5 started in 1999 and we want to take 
into account experience, if any, in the previous programme. In addition, as we use the forward 
values of output measures to capture long-term relationships, in some estimates the number of 
years with complete information is reduced to 4.  
Since our objective is to analyse the impact of collaboration within the FP on performance 
variables, our unity of analysis is the firm. In this sense, although some firms have applied in 
more than one proposal every year, we only consider one project per firm and year. We have 
given priority to those supported projects with bigger subsidies. After that, 1,555 observations 
have been eliminated, where 142 observations refer to supported projects. We have also ex-
cluded observations of the extreme values of employment and sales growth rates. Specifically, 
we have eliminated values in the extreme percentiles (1 and 99%).  In addition, we dropped 
negative values for productivity, tangibles and intangible fixed assets. Overall, the final sam-
ple consists of an unbalanced panel of 56,945 observations, 11,435 companies, and 2,536 pro-
posals.  
The CDTI-PM database allows us to analyse specifically those factors related to agency selec-
tion7, while the information from the joint database is used mainly to estimate the firm’s deci-
sion to engage in a cooperative project, and the impact of participation on the firm’s output.  
 
                                                 
6 Coverage of the data is basically restricted to firms that have at least 10 employees (annual average), but we 
have also included 615 micro-companies (0.5% of the CCD, chosen again by means of a random sampling 
scheme), given that 219 applicants of cooperative FP projects belong to this category.  
7 Proposals are evaluated by independent experts according to some common criteria. However, such information is 
absent from our database. 
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4. Results 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of the model depicted in Section 3. As 
equations (1) to (4) point out, we assume a recursive model where feedback from performance 
variables to the decision of applying for a FP cooperation project is not allowed. Taking this 
into account, we follow a three-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, a probit model 
with sample selection including the decision to participate in a cooperative R&D project with-
in the FP and the decision of awarding by the EC are jointly estimated consistently by maxi-
mum likelihood. In the second stage, we estimate the generation of new knowledge (equation 
(3)), approaching the innovation output by the intangible fixed asset and introducing the pre-
dicted value of the probability of participating within the FP as an explanatory variable. In the 
last stage, the productivity growth equation (4) is estimated by including a proxy of the new 
knowledge as an explanatory variable; specifically, we introduce the predicted value of intan-
gible fixed assets.  
 
4.1 Cooperation within the FP 
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the joint estimation of equations (1) and (2) as a Probit 
model with sample selection by maximum likelihood, on the assumption that the error terms 
of both equations could be correlated. The first one exhibits the coefficients of the probit 
model for the firm’s decision to apply for an FP cooperation project (equation (1)), while the 
second one corresponds to the probability of being awarded the subsidy by the EC (equation 
(2)). We also report marginal effects in square brackets. Notice that the correlation term   in 
Table 2 is significant, pointing out the necessity of estimating a selection model for the 
awarding decision8.  
The explanatory variables included in equations (1) and (2) follow the selection made by Ba-
rajas and Huergo (2010) for a quite similar sample9. The results basically confirm the evi-
dence obtained in that paper. As for the applying equation, as can be seen in Table 1, most 
coefficients are statistically significant, although marginal effects are small except for those 
variables measuring the FP experience in the previous year. In general, explanatory variables 
                                                 
8 The Heckman procedure for the binary response variable in STATA does not take into account the panel struc-
ture of the data and the information is treated as a pool. However, in Barajas and Huergo (2010), the decision to 
apply has been estimated as a random-effects probit model taking into account the panel structure of the data and 
the results are basically the same. 
9 Find the exact definitions of the variables in Appendix A. 
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increase the probability of applying for an FP cooperation project, with the exception of the 
liquidity ratio, which has a negative impact, which is consistent with the idea that cooperation 
can be considered a strategy for avoiding financial obstacles associated with R&D projects for 
firms with financial constraints.  
 
Table 1: Probability of applying within the FP. Probit estimates. 
 
 Coefficient S. E. 
Time dummies     
     Year 2000 -0.054  [-0.003] 0.038 
     Year 2001 -0.040  [-0.002] 0.037 
     Year 2002 -0.280 *** [-0.012] 0.041 
     Year 2003 0.055  [0.003] 0.036 
     Year 2004 -0.258 *** [-0.011] 0.040 
     Year 2005 -0.233 *** [-0.010] 0.041 
Prior experience in FP proposals 0.564 *** [0.047] 0.029 
Granted project in previous year 1.545 *** [0.289] 0.045 
Rejected proposal in previous year 1.650 *** [0.315] 0.030 
Exporter 0.125 *** [0.006] 0.023 
Liquidity ratio -0.048 ** [-0.002] 0.020 
Intangible fixed assets over employment 0.033 *** [0.002] 0.008 
EBITDA margin 0.232 *** [0.012] 0.087 
Stock market 0.322 *** [0.023] 0.067 
Firm’s size dummies (no. of workers)     
     From 10 to 49 -0.239 *** [-0.011] 0.041 
     From 50 to 99 -0.351 *** [-0.014] 0.044 
     From 100 to 199 -0.395 *** [-0.016] 0.045 
     More than 200 -0.385 *** [-0.018] 0.040 
 High-tech services     
     Post and telecommunications 0.603 *** [0.055] 0.068 
     Computer and related activities 0.459 *** [0.036] 0.039 
     Research and development 0.583 *** [0.053] 0.072 
 High and medium-tech manufacturing     
     Chemicals and chemical products 0.020  [0.001] 0.049 
     Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.020  [0.001] 0.051 
     Office machinery and computers 0.495 *** [0.041] 0.144 
     Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.052  [0.003] 0.076 
     Radio, television and communication  0.257 *** [0.017] 0.076 
     Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.156  [0.009] 0.096 
     Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.072  [0.004] 0.073 
     Other transport equipment 0.432 *** [0.034] 0.079 
Log of likelihood function -8,190.55 
Number of observations 56,945 
 
Marginal effects in square brackets. S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant and regional dummies. Dummies excluded for firms with fewer than 10 employees and 
the year 1999. Marginal effects are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to 
the change from 0 to 1.  
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Table 2: Probability of being awarded. Probit estimates. 
 Coefficient S. E. 
Year of the application    
     Year 2000 0.064  [0.007] 0.114 
     Year 2001 0.241 ** [0.029] 0.109 
     Year 2002 0.149  [0.017] 0.126 
     Year 2003 -0.251  [-0.023] 0.219 
     Year 2004 0.001  [0.000] 0.217 
     Year 2005 0.016  [0.002] 0.200 
Participation of organisms -0.470 *** [-0.050] 0.168 
Size (of consortium) 0.707 *** [0.075] 0.071 
FP budget for the specific programme -0.009  [-0.001] 0.018 
Leader nationality    
    British -0.032  [-0.003] 0.122 
    Dutch 0.345 * [0.048] 0.188 
    French 0.220 * [0.028] 0.127 
    German 0.361 *** [0.051] 0.113 
    Italian -0.104  [-0.010] 0.130 
    Spanish 0.312 *** [0.042] 0.087 
Technological area    
    Aeronautic and aerospace 0.259  [0.034] 0.246 
    Agro-food 0.261  [0.034] 0.269 
    Environment and energy 0.024  [0.003] 0.230 
    ICT 0.129  [0.015] 0.217 
    Innovation programmes 0.385  [0.055] 0.335 
    New materials 0.247  [0.032] 0.195 
    Transports 0.311 ** [0.042] 0.130 
Geographical distance -1.079 *** [-0.114] 0.107 
Prior experience in granted FP projects 0.143 * [0.017] 0.080 
Granted project in previous year -0.031  [-0.003] 0.109 
Rho     0.089 *  0.046 
Log of likelihood function -8,190.55 
Number of censored / uncensored obs. 54,409 / 2,536 
 
Marginal effects in square brackets. S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummy excluded for the year 1999. Marginal effects are computed 
at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1.  
 
When we analyse the coefficients of the time variables, we observe that firms applied in 
smaller proportion in 2002, 2004 and 2005. The first one corresponds to the last year of the 
edition of the FP5 and confirms that firms tend to submit a smaller percentage of proposals 
when the current programme edition is finishing, probably due to the lower number of calls 
for proposals. The other two dummy variables correspond to the FP6 and allow us to compare 
both FP5 and FP6. The results are consistent with the fact that, in comparison with FP5, FP6 
 19
was less favourable to the technological objectives of Spanish firms10, which consequently 
applied in smaller proportions.  
As expected, previous experience in FP proposals increases the probability of applying in 
future editions and especially when the prior experience took place during the previous year. 
Since the application process within the FP is very costly, companies in consortia that have 
been rejected will try to profit from the accumulated knowledge, applying to the following 
calls. The probability of engaging in an FP project increases about 30 points for firms with 
experience in the last year, while it increases almost five points for firms with experience in 
previous editions of the FP. In this sense, firms seem to follow a process of learning by doing 
in the application for FP projects.  
With respect to the rest of the explanatory variables, exporters, firms that are on the stock 
market, and companies that present a higher ratio between intangible fixed assets and em-
ployment, are also more likely to apply11. The earnings in terms of sales (approached by 
EBITDA), as a measure of ex-ante firm market power, also present a positive effect. This 
result is coherent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the less competitive the markets are, 
the more incentives for firms to innovate (and to participate in R&D consortia) since they are 
better able to capture innovation benefits. However, this empirical evidence could also be 
supporting the existence of an informal competitive process among proponents in order to 
take part in those FP consortia led by the most reputed organisation. Thus, the most profitable 
firms have a higher probability of being selected by consortia coordinators. 
The coefficients of the set of size dummies indicate a negative impact of size on the probabil-
ity of applying12. This unexpected result can be affected by the fact that our control sample is 
biased towards large firms, which are chosen on the basis of a census, while firms employing 
between 10 and 200 employees are selected by a random sampling scheme. Additional work 
would be necessary to study this result more closely13.  
                                                 
10 The FP6 introduced new instruments, such as the Integrated Projects and the Networks of Excellence, giving 
priority to projects with more ambitious goals, longer development terms and bigger budgets.  
11 This evidence is consistent with Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007), who find that the key characteristic of 
participants in European programs is the extent to which the firm operates in foreign markets, as measured by 
export intensity.  
12 The results do not differ when the firm number of employees is included instead of the set of size dummies. 
The same happens in Tables 4 and 5. 
13 Barajas and Huergo (2010) present complementary estimations for two sub-samples: SME and large firms. 
They found a non-linear effect of size which is negative for the SME and positive for large firms. 
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The last rows of Table 1 present the coefficients of industry dummies14. Firms that carry out 
high-tech activities are also more prone to become proponents. The probability of engaging in 
an FP project increases more than 5 points for companies in the Post and telecommunications 
service sector and R&D sector. Also, affiliation to Computer and related activities, Office 
machinery and computers, and the transport equipment industry increases the probability of 
applying by about 4 points.15  
Table 2 shows the coefficients corresponding to the estimation of the equation for the proba-
bility of being awarded aid by the EC. Again, the results confirm the evidence provided by 
Barajas and Huergo (2010). Firstly, the presence of public organisations within a consortium 
and the distance among the partners negatively affect the viability of the proposal. Both vari-
ables can be reflecting the existence of coordination costs. With respect to the participation of 
non-entrepreneurial organisations, these costs could be associated with the differences in pri-
vate and public cooperation routines, especially concerning the protection of innovation re-
sults.  
Secondly, the inclusion of a new member in the consortium increases the probability of being 
supported by 7.5 points. In this case, the required technological diversity of the research 
equipment seems to exceed the coordination cost associated with each additional partner. 
Thirdly, the probability of being supported increases when the project belongs to the 
Transport area16, and especially when the proposal is led by a German organisation. Spanish 
firms that participate in consortia led by companies or organisations from Germany – a very 
active country within the FP- probably earn greater experience, enjoy better coordination rou-
tines, and therefore are more likely to receive aid from the EC.  
                                                 
14 We also include some other industry dummies with statistically significant effects. Specifically, Education, 
Clothing apparel and footwear and Other business activities, which include architectural and engineering activi-
ties and related technical consultancy, should be noted. An opposite case is the Hotels and restaurants industry, 
with a lower probability of participating in technological projects. In reference to the Energy sector, both FP4 
and FP5 had specific programmes for the development of sustainable energies, which increased the occasions for 
firms to present proposals. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
15 As control variables we also consider a set of geographical dummies, given that the more technological Span-
ish firms tend to locate in specific regions. In particular firms located in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Madrid 
and Valencia show higher probabilities of submitting an application, which is consistent with the major concen-
tration of technological firms in these regions. 
16 Most of the total budget of the FPs is allocated to information and communication technologies. Therefore, it 
seems that the EU gives priority to these technological areas. Our result that only firms which carry out FP pro-
grammes in Transport show a greater probability of receiving aid can be a consequence of the criteria followed 
to eliminate the firms which have more than one project. Most of the dropped observations are projects belong-
ing to ICT, Transport and Aeronautical technologies areas.   
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Previous experience in FP projects has less impact on the probability of being supported than 
on the probability of applying. It seems clear that “learning-by-doing” is a more relevant fac-
tor in explaining the decision to participate due to the complexity of the FP procedures and 
the need to exploit scope economies once the effort to apply is made and the consortium is 
shaped. 
Finally, although the temporal dummies which indicate the year in which the firm applied are 
jointly significant, they do not present significant coefficients in any year. That is, according 
to these results, there are no specific differences in the probability of being supported in both 
FP5 and FP6.  
4.2 Impact on knowledge accumulation 
We next proceed to estimate equation (3). As already stated, to capture the impact of support-
ed cooperative projects, our measure of technological output is the proportion of intangible 
fixed assets over employment. We assume that this constitutes an indirect measure of innova-
tion output, given that the knowledge generated in the R&D project will usually be reflected 
by the volume of intangibles inside the firm, especially if the new knowledge is protected 
through patents17. In Table 3, we describe the variables used in the following econometric 
analysis.  
The firms’ technological capabilities are represented by their intangible fixed assets, given the 
intangible character of R&D18. The difference of means test confirms that the average of this 
variable in the sample is higher for participants within the FP than for non-participants. The 
proportion of intangibles over employment is slightly lower for participants. On the contrary, 
the percentage of tangible fixed assets per employee is higher for supported firms. Partici-
pants seem to be more productive, although the difference is small. 
We also take into account whether the firm’s activity corresponds to a high-tech service sector 
or a high or medium-tech manufacturing sector according to the OCDE classification. The 
                                                 
17 Most previous empirical evidence approaches technological inputs by R&D expenditures and new knowledge 
by product and process innovations, or sales generated by new products. However, this information is not avail-
able in our database.  
18 Spanish accounting rules allow for the capitalisation of R&D expenditures under certain conditions (mainly 
when there are reasonable expectations of marketable results).   
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frequencies in Table 3 reflect a high presence of these activities among participants, especial-
ly in high-tech services.  
 
Table 3: Features of the participants. Descriptive statistics 
 
Means of quantitative variables: Total sample Participants Non-participants 
Intangible Fixed Assets (€) 3,120.05 7,362.01 3,091.83 
Intangible Fixed Assets over Employment (€) 13.93 11.91 13.94 
Tangible Fixed Assets (€) 22,272.04 108,593.5 21,697.33 
Tangible Fixed Assets over Employment (€) 76.49 127.38 76.15 
Productivity (sales over employment) (€) 247.17 268.77 247.02 
Firm size (nº of  employees) 355.41 877.41 351.93 
Frequencies of binary variables: Total sample Participants Non-participants 
Stock market 1.25 6.87 1.21 
Exporter 49.81 66.76 49.70 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 17.07 25.55 17.01 
High-tech services 5.88 15.66 5.82 
 
 
A firm’s export activity is captured through a binary variable that takes the value one if the 
firm is an exporter during the period. As we can see in Table 3, the percentage of exporters 
among participants is 16 points higher than among non-applicants.  
As an additional control variable, we include a dichotomy variable that reflects whether the 
firm is listed on the stock market. This kind of company is usually financially more consoli-
dated and international funds could be less attractive to it. However, firms on the stock market 
tend to show more formalised quality procedures and therefore could have more systematic 
collaboration routines. In our sample, stock market companies are more frequent among par-
ticipants. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 4. We assume that all explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous and the estimation is carried out by OLS using a random effect model for 
panel data.  We have included some control variables in the specification like time, size, ex-
port activity, industries (to capture some sector-specific effects as technological opportunities) 
and regional (to control for the concentration effect in some Spanish areas) dummies. 
The coefficients reported in this table are semi-elasticities because the dependent variable is 
measured in logarithms. Specifically, as all explanatory variables are dummies, they show the 
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variation rate in unitary terms of intangible fixed assets per employee when the explanatory 
variable changes from 0 to 1.   
 
Table 4: Intangible fixed assets per employee (t+5)   
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
FP participant (observed) 0.083  0.061    
FP participant (predicted)   0.394 ** 0.172 
Stock market 1.174 *** 0.182 1.169 *** 0.181 
Exporter 0.156 *** 0.030 0.154 *** 0.030 
Firm size dummies (nº. of workers)      
  From 10 to 49 -0.104 ** 0.048 -0.104 ** 0.048 
  From 50 to 99 -0.201 *** 0.052 -0.201 *** 0.052 
  From 100 to 199 -0.279 *** 0.053 -0.280 *** 0.053 
  More than 200 -0.358 *** 0.053 -0.358 *** 0.053 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.073 *** 0.041 0.072 * 0.041 
High-tech services 0.318 *** 0.070 0.314 *** 0.070 
Sigma of u 1.210 1.209 
Rho 0.868 0.867 
Number of observations 23,089 23,089 
 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the 
constant, and regional and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers. 
 
 
Due to the pre-competitive orientation of FP projects, we assume that their results will have 
effects in the long term. In this sense, our dependent variable refers to the period t+5, where t 
is the awarding year. In fact, when we consider periods (t+3) and (t+4), we do not find any 
significant effect of the participation in FP projects on intangible fixed assets. This is consist-
ence with previous evidence which tries to capture these relationships in shorter periods (see, 
for example, Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002, and Dekker and Kleinknecht, 2008).19  
We are interested in comparing the effect of predicted participation versus observed participa-
tion. In Table 4, the first column corresponds to the model in which we included the dummy 
for observed participation (yes /no) as an explanatory variable, while in column (2), this vari-
able is substituted by the prediction obtained in the previous step (estimations of equations (1) 
and (2)). It should be remarked that taking the selection problem into account is relevant: 
whereas the coefficient for observed participation is not significant, the predicted probability 
                                                 
19 When we try the larger period (t+6), the number of observations is reduced significantly and it is more diffi-
cult to capture robust effects. However, knowledge generated in previous periods is still a positive determinant 
of labour productivity in (t+6).  
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of participation positively affects our technological output. Specifically, being a firm that co-
operates in an FP increases the ratio of intangible fixed active over employment almost 40%. 
This result is in concordance with those presented by Dekker et al (2008).  
With respect to the control variables, industry dummies are highly significant. Firms belong-
ing to high-tech manufacturing and services and medium-tech manufacturing have a higher 
potential of generating technological outputs.  The level of intangible fixed assets per em-
ployee increases 7% in manufacturing and more than 31% in services.  
We obtain a negative effect of the size dummies. Most previous empirical evidence for Span-
ish manufacturing provides a positive relationship between firm size and the probability of 
being engaged in technological activities and obtaining product or process innovations, stress-
ing the capacity of large firms to exploit economies of scale. However, a negative relationship 
is found in terms of innovation intensity: large firms present a lower proportion of resources 
in R&D with respect to smaller firms.  
Finally, being a company listed on the stock market or being an exporter also positively af-
fects the generation of new knowledge. Specifically, firms operating in international markets 
register an increment of 15% in the ratio of intangible fixed assets over employment.  
4.3 Impact on labour productivity  
The variable used to analyse the impact of cooperation on economic performance is labour 
productivity, measured as the ratio between total sales and number of employees. Estimations 
of the productivity equation (4) are shown in Table 5. Again, the estimation is carried out by 
OLS using a random effect model for panel data.    
The coefficients reported in Table 5 are elasticities or semi-elasticities, since the dependent 
variable is the logarithms of sales per employee. In addition to control variables referring to 
size, industry, year, and firm location, we have included a proxy of physical capital intensity 
in the model, measured throughout the variable “tangible fixed asset per employee”. Finally, 
to capture the effect of knowledge accumulation on productivity, we have included the pre-
dicted value of “intangible fixed assets over employment” from equation (3).  
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By means of these estimations, we analyse whether participation within the FP has not only 
an indirect effect but also a direct effect on firms’ economic success. As we have demonstrat-
ed in the previous section, the predicted probability of being awarded aid enhances the ratio of 
intangible fixed assets. If we find a positive relationship between this proxy of technological 
output and the level of productivity, the indirect economic impact of cooperation on produc-
tivity would be confirmed. If we find that FP participation also has a significant effect on 
productivity, an additional direct effect of cooperation on economic performance would be 
corroborated.   
In the first column of Table 5, we present the obtained results, considering neither the ob-
served nor the predicted participation to be explanatory variables. Under these conditions, the 
impact of the predicted value of “intangible fixed assets per employee” on productivity is 
clearly significant, reflecting a difference in favor of innovative firms. Specifically, if the ratio 
of intangible assets duplicates, it causes productivity to grow more than 12% (see Table 5). 
As firms participating in FP present higher technological outputs, this result supports an indi-
rect effect of cooperation on this performance variable.  
 
Table 5: Labour productivity (t+5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
FP participant (observed)   0.010  0.032    
FP participant (predicted)     0.044  0.070 
Intangible Fixed Assets per employee 
(predicted) (t+5) 
0.121 *** 0.009 0.120 *** 0.012 0.120 *** 0.012 
Tangible Fixed Assets per employee (t+5) 0.336 *** 0.005 0.336 *** 0.014 0.336 *** 0.014 
Stock market -0.110  0.089 -0.111  0.168 -0.111  0.168 
Exporter 0.381 *** 0.022 0.381 *** 0.025 0.381 *** 0.025 
Firm size dummies (nº of workers)        
  From 10 to 49 0.079 *** 0.024 0.079 ** 0.036 0.079 ** 0.036 
  From 50 to 99 0.097 *** 0.027 0.097 ** 0.038 0.097 ** 0.038 
  From 100 to 199 0.122 *** 0.028 0.122 *** 0.039 0.122 *** 0.039 
  More than 200 0.130 *** 0.028 0.130 *** 0.039 0.130 *** 0.039 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.152 *** 0.029 0.152 *** 0.028 0.152 *** 0.028 
High-tech services -0.094 ** 0.047 -0.094 ** 0.046 -0.094 ** 0.046 
Sigma of u 0.889 0.889 0.889 
Rho 0.894 0.894 0.894 
Number of observations 22,985 22,985 22,985 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the 
constant, and regional and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with less than 10 workers. 
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In columns (2) and (3), the specification also includes the dummy for observed and predicted 
participation, respectively. As can be seen, both of them are not significant. Therefore, it 
seems that cooperation in FP does not have a direct effect on performance variables. This re-
sult is in concordance with those presented by Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002). Using a 
different methodology, they do not find significant differences in the labour productivity of 
firms that have participated in FP 3 and FP 4. In a similar way, Dekker et al (2008) confirm 
that innovative output – sales of innovative product per employee- is not enhanced by partici-
pation in the EU FP in France, Germany and The Netherlands.   
Additionally, there are no changes in the coefficients of the rest of variables. Capital- inten-
sive firms – approached by the ratio “tangible fixed assets per employee” – are also more pro-
ductive. As in previous empirical evidence, exporting firms are also more efficient than non-
exporting firms.  
With respect to the size dummies, we find a positive linear relationship between firm size and 
productivity.  As expected, we also obtain that firms from high-tech and medium-tech manu-
facturing industries present larger levels of productivity. However, the opposite happens with 
firms in high-tech services. 
 
Finally, as a robustness check we estimate the model using the growth rate of labour produc-
tivity as a dependent variable in equation (4)20. In this case, intangible fixed assets per em-
ployee are also included in growth rates in equation (3). The results confirm the positive im-
pact of cooperation within the FP on the technological capacity of firms and the indirect effect 
of participating in the FP on labour productivity through intangible fixed assets. We have also 
tested whether our results are robust to other measures of economic performance that are 
available in our database and that should indirectly capture improvements in the firm’s effi-
ciency or market share associated with the generation of new knowledge. Specifically, we 
consider the firm sales and ETBIDA21. The results confirm those obtained with labour produc-
tivity. 
                                                 
20 See the results of the estimates for equations (3) and (4) in Tables B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B.  
21 See Table B.3 of Appendix B. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of R&D cooperation on economic perfor-
mance. Empirical analysis is focused on RJV supported by the R&D Framework Programme 
(FP) of the European Union and, more specifically, on Spanish firms participating during the 
period 1995-2005. 
Although the average annual budget of the FP represents scarcely 4% of the total public funds 
devoted to R&D in European countries, this programme is considered the core instrument of 
EU technological policy. The FP contributes to meeting the goals of the Lisbon strategy and 
the European Research Area (ERA) initiative by means of increasing private expenditure on 
R&D and cross-border transfer of knowledge from public institutions to firms. 
Ex-post evaluation and monitoring reports assessing FP performance have been carried out 
periodically under the auspices of the European Commission, recognising that there has been 
little evaluation of the effects of the FP on economy-level competitiveness and, moreover, it is 
not possible to corroborate that knowledge generated in R&D consortia is transferred to the 
industry to any great extent (European Commission, 2009).   
Previous empirical analyses agree about the positive effect of the cooperation carried out 
within the FP on variables related to technological capabilities (Georghiou et al., 1992; 
Luukkonen, 1998; Arnold et al., 2008; Polt, Vonortas and Fisher, 2008; Dekker and Klein-
knecht, 2008), but evidence about the effect on economic performance is scarce. Considering 
the specific features of the FP (ambitious projects; consortia shaped by different types of or-
ganisations located in different countries; long-term periods; pre-competitive orientation in 
most of the cases), it is obvious that the economic effect of this kind of project should be ana-
lysed from a different perspective.  
In this respect, one of the main contributions of the present paper is the application of a recur-
sive model structure to capture the relationship between cooperation, knowledge generation 
and economic results. The model, which is an adaptation of the CDM model linking techno-
logical inputs and outputs to productivity, has the following basic structure: (i) firms decide 
whether or not to apply for a FP cooperation project; (ii) the proposal is awarded or rejected 
by the European Commission; (iii) the innovation activities involved in the cooperative R&D 
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project succeed through the generation of new knowledge (represented by intangibles); (iv) 
the addition of this new knowledge to the production process causes productivity growth.  
We think that, throughout this integrated methodology, policy makers can receive feedback 
about the collaboration process as a whole: from the decision to apply to the economic impact 
of that participation. Overall, our results show that R&D cooperation within the FP is consid-
ered by innovative firms to be a strategic option for improving their technological capabilities 
in the medium and long term. But, at the same time, firms perceive that cooperation in the FP 
is a resource-consuming activity. Cooperation entails significant costs that not all firms can 
afford. 
In particular, our results confirm the evidence obtained in a previous paper by Barajas and 
Huergo (2010) about the determinants of applying in the FP and being awarded aid by the 
European Commission. Previous experience in FP proposals increases the probability of ap-
plying in future editions, suggesting that firms follow a process of learning by doing in the 
application for FP projects. Policy makers should take this fact into account and make a clear 
distinction between firms with previous experience in cooperative projects and other firms. 
The first group has already developed internal capabilities to participate in research consortia 
and need support mainly in reducing costs and risks associated with R&D. Non-experienced 
firms also need support to deal with the process of previous learning and, therefore, will profit 
from public diffusion, information and training measures.  
Going one step further, we have confirmed that the predicted probability of participating in 
the FP has a positive impact on firms’ technological capabilities. Specifically, five years after 
the project is awarded aid, the ratio of intangible fixed assets over employment increases al-
most 40%. 
Regarding economic impact, the key idea supported by this study is that the effect of partici-
pation in R&D consortia on firms’ productivity is produced through the channel of improving 
their technological capabilities. In this respect, it is necessary to take into account that the 
evaluation criteria followed in the FP refers to scientific and technological excellence, coordi-
nation abilities of the consortium, European added value (in terms of critical mass of re-
sources mobilised and contribution to Community policies) and potential for disseminating 
the knowledge and achieving innovations. Therefore, results must be assessed according to 
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these criteria and from a long-term perspective, once the specific project is finished and the 
market dynamic has allowed firms to introduce innovations. From this perspective, we find 
that, if intangible fixed assets per employee duplicate, it causes productivity to grow more 
than 12% five years after awarding aid to the project. This confirms the effectiveness of RJV 
in promoting economic growth, one of the main objectives of European policy makers since 
the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000. 
The empirical evidence obtained in this paper opens a new perspective to assess the economic 
impact of RJV. Nevertheless, limitations and future research lines should be outlined. The 
direct impact of this type of cooperative agreements seems to be related to the improvement 
in innovative capabilities that, to a large extent, are intangible assets, which are difficult to 
measure. Considering intangible assets introduced in accounting, our work finds that partici-
pation in R&D consortia within the FP has a positive impact. Since accounting systems only 
reflect some intangible assets, such as capitalised R&D expenditures, patents and software, 
the pending issue is how to capture the impact of other intangibles. At present, surveys and 
interviews seem to be the best option for complementing this information. Our knowledge 
about the economic impact of the FP, and about the economic impact of R&D consortia in 
general, will improve as more research on the economic value of intangible assets is done.   
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Appendix A: Definition of variables 
 
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
EBITDA margin EBITDA divided by sales. 
Exporter Company exports during the period. 
Firm size Firm’s number of employees in the current year (<10, 10-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200+) 
FP budget for the specific programme Percentage of the total FP budget allocated to each specific programme. 
Geographical distance Percentage of partners from Northern Europe, Eastern Europe and non-European coun-
tries in the total number of partners. The percentage is multiplied by 2 or 3 if the part-
ners are, respectively, from 2 or 3 of the aforementioned geographical areas. 
Granted project in the previous year At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a granted 
project the previous year. 
High-tech services Company belongs to the high-tech services (NACE2 codes 64, 72, 73).  
High and medium-tech manufacturing Company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors  (NACE2 codes 
24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35).  
Intangible fixed assets per employee Ratio between intangible fixed assets and total employment in the current year (in 
logs.) 
Labour productivity Sales per employee (in logs.) 
Leader nationality The leader of the consortium is (British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish). 
Liquidity ratio Shareholders’ funds in non-current liabilities in the current year 
Participation of organisations Ratio between the number of non-entrepreneurial organisations and the total number of 
consortium members in the proposal. 
Prior experience in FP proposals The Spanish firm applied to the FP in the edition previous to the current one. 
Prior experience in FP granted projects At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a coopera-
tive project financed during the FP edition previous to the current one. 
Rejected proposal in the previous year At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a rejected 
project during the previous year.  
Size of the consortium Total number of members (firms, public organisations or other institutions) in the con-
sortium (in logs). 
Stock market Company is listed on the stock market.  
Tangible fixed assets per employee Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total employment in the current year (in logs.) 
Technological area Project is related to (ICT, new materials, environment and energy, transport, agro-food, 
aeronautic and aerospace, innovation programmes).  
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Appendix B: Complementary estimates 
 
 
Table B.1: Growth of intangible fixed assets per employee (t+5)   
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
FP participant (observed) 0.094  0.065    
FP participant (predicted)    0.355 ** 0.158 
Stock market 0.037  0.042 0.034  0.042 
Exporter -0.011  0.008 -0.012  0.008 
Firm size dummies (nº. of workers)       
  From 10 to 49 0.040  0.028 0.041  0.028 
  From 50 to 99 0.034  0.028 0.035  0.028 
  From 100 to 199 0.022  0.027 0.022  0.027 
  More than 200 0.023  0.027 0.023  0.027 
High and medium-tech manufacturing -0.003  0.010 -0.004  0.010 
High-tech services -0.033 * 0.017 -0.036 ** 0.018 
Sigma of u 0.027 0.029 
Rho 0.002 0.003 
Number of observations 22,277 22,277 
 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the 
constant, and regional and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers. 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Labour productivity growth (t+5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. Coefficient S. E. 
FP participant (observed)   -0.006  0.037    
FP participant (predicted)     -0.015  0.080 
Growth of intangible fixed assets per 
employee, predicted (t+5) 0.375 *** 0.113 0.381 *** 0.116 0.389 *** 0.144 
Growth of tangible fixed assets per 
employee (t+5) 0.446 *** 0.026 0.446 *** 0.026 0.446 *** 0.026 
Stock market -0.081  0.056 -0.081  0.056 -0.081  0.056 
Exporter 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.007 
Firm size dummies (nº of workers)          
  From 10 to 49 0.025  0.030 0.025  0.030 0.025  0.030 
  From 50 to 99 0.024  0.030 0.023  0.030 0.023  0.030 
  From 100 to 199 0.044  0.029 0.043  0.029 0.043  0.029 
  More than 200 0.036  0.029 0.035  0.029 0.035  0.029 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.014 * 0.008 0.014 * 0.008 0.014 * 0.008 
High-tech services 0.038 ** 0.016 0.039 ** 0.016 0.039 ** 0.016 
Sigma of u 0.177 0.177 0.177 
Rho 0.168 0.168 0.168 
Number of observations 22,137 22,137 22,137 
 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the 
constant and regional dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers.
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Table B.3: ETBIDA (t+5) and Sales (t+5) 
 
 ETBIDA (t+5) Sales (t+5)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S. E. 
FP participant (observed) -0.324  0.187     -0.007  0.034    
FP participant (predicted)   -0.293  0.345     0.092  0.089 
Intangible Fixed Assets per employee 
(predicted) (t+5) 
0.258 *** 0.026 0.259 *** 0.026 0.259 *** 0.024 0.171 *** 0.018 0.172 *** 0.018 0.170 *** 0.018 
Tangible Fixed Assets per employee (t+5) 0.348 *** 0.020 0.348 *** 0.020 0.348 *** 0.017 0.038 *** 0.014 0.038 *** 0.014 0.038 *** 0.014 
Stock market 0.192  0.333 0.201  0.333 0.196  0.227 0.985 *** 0.236 0.985 *** 0.237 0.984 *** 0.237 
Exporter 0.221 *** 0.059 0.222 *** 0.059 0.222 *** 0.057 0.513 *** 0.035 0.513 *** 0.035 0.513 *** 0.035 
Firm size dummies (nº of workers)              
  From 10 to 49 0.859 *** 0.094 0.857 *** 0.094 0.858 *** 0.094 0.284 *** 0.046 0.284 *** 0.046 0.284 *** 0.046 
  From 50 to 99 1.398 *** 0.101 1.397 *** 0.101 1.398 *** 0.100 0.583 *** 0.049 0.583 *** 0.049 0.584 *** 0.049 
  From 100 to 199 1.966 *** 0.104 1.965 *** 0.104 1.966 *** 0.101 0.897 *** 0.051 0.897 *** 0.051 0.897 *** 0.051 
  More than 200 2.447 *** 0.104 2.447 *** 0.104 2.448 *** 0.099 1.126 *** 0.054 1.126 *** 0.054 1.126 *** 0.054 
High and medium-tech manufacturing -0.071  0.080 -0.068  0.079 -0.069  0.074 -0.065  0.046 -0.065  0.046 -0.065  0.046 
High-tech services -0.302 *** 0.138 -0.298 *** 0.138 -0.299 *** 0.122 -0.903 *** 0.078 -0.903 *** 0.078 -0.904 *** 0.078 
Sigma of u 2.143 2.142 2.143 1.188 1.188 1.187 
Rho 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.941 0.941 0.941 
Number of observations 23,072 23,072 23,072 22,985 22,985 22,985 
 
S. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the constant, and regional and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded 
for firms with less than 10 workers. 
 
 
